k-Set agreement is a central problem of fault-tolerant distributed computing. Considering a set of n processes, where up to t may commit failures, let us assume that each process proposes a value. The problem consists in defining an algorithm such that each nonfaulty process decides a value, at most k different values are decided, and the decided values satisfy some context-depending validity condition. Synchronous message-passing algorithms solving k-set agreement have been proposed for different failure models (mainly process crashes, and process Byzantine failures). Differently, k-set agreement cannot be solved in failure-prone asynchronous message-passing systems when t ≥ k. To circumvent this impossibility an asynchronous system must be enriched with additional computational power.
INTRODUCTION

Distributed agreement in the presence of process failures.
The world is distributed and more and more applications are now distributed. Moreover, when considering the core of non-trivial distributed applications, it appears that the computing entities (processes) have to agree in one way or another, for example to take a common decision, execute specific actions, or validate some commitment. Said another way, agreement problems lie at the core of distributed computing.
The most famous distributed agreement problem is the consensus problem. Let us consider a set of processes, where some of them may commit failures. Assuming each process proposes a value, the consensus problem is defined by the following properties: each non-faulty process must decide a value (termination), such that the same value is decided by the non-faulty processes (agreement), and this value satisfies some validity condition, which depends on the proposed values and the considered failure model [7, 17] .
The k-set agreement problem is a natural weakening of consensus [6] . It allows the non-faulty processes to decide different values, as long as no more than k values are decided. Hence, consensus is 1-set agreement. Let us notice that k-set agreement can be easily solved in crash-prone systems where k (the maximal number of different values that can be decided) is greater than t (the maximal number of processes that may be faulty). The k-set agreement problem has applications, e.g., to compute a common subset of wavelengths (each process proposes a wavelength and at most k of them are selected), or to duplicate k state machines where at most one is required to progress forever [9, 22] .
Byzantine failures.
This failure type has first been introduced in the context of synchronous distributed systems [12, 17, 20] , and then investigated in the context of asynchronous distributed systems [1, 13, 21] . A process has a Byzantine behavior when it arbitrarily deviates from its intended behavior. We then say that it "commits a Byzantine failure" (otherwise we say the process is non-faulty or correct). This bad behavior can be intentional (malicious) or simply the result of a transient fault that altered the local state of a process, thereby modifying its behavior in an unpredictable way. Let us notice that process crashes (unexpected halting) define a strict subset of Byzantine failures.
Let us remind that (as already said) the world is distributed, asynchronous message-passing systems are more and more pervasive, processes have to agree in one way or another, and the assumption "no process has a bad behavior" is no longer sensible. Hence, agreement in asynchronous Byzantine message-passing systems is becoming a more and more important issue of fault-tolerance.
An impossibility result and how to cope with it.
Let consider a system made up of n processes, where up to t may be faulty. Whatever the value of k (i.e., even if k ≤ t), k-set agreement can always be solved if the system is synchronous [20] . The situation is different in asynchronous systems where k-set agreement is impossible to solve in the process crash failure model when k ≤ t [2, 11, 23] . As Byzantine failures are more severe than process crash failures, this impossibility remains true in asynchronous Byzantine systems.
It follows from this impossibility that, when k ≤ t, the underlying asynchronous distributed system has to be enriched with additional computational power for k-set agreement to be solved. Such an additional computational power can be provided with minimal synchrony assumptions (e.g., [3] which considers k = 1 and Byzantine failures), appropriate failure detectors (e.g., [8] which considers k = 1 and Byzantine failures), or randomization (e.g., [19] which considers k = 1 and Byzantine failures, and [5, 15] which consider k ≤ t and crash failures, in read/write shared memory systems and message-passing systems, respectively).
Intrusion-tolerant agreement with respect to Byzantine processes.
The validity property associated with a distributed agreement problem relates its outputs to its inputs. In a system where processes may commit Byzantine failures, there is no way to direct a Byzantine process to decide some specific value, and consequently the k-set agreement validity property can only be on the values decided by the correct processes.
A classical validity property for Byzantine agreement states that, when the non-faulty processes propose the same value, they must decide it. Hence, as soon as two non-faulty processes propose different values, any value can be decided by the correct processes, even a value "proposed" by a Byzantine process. (Let us observe that a Byzantine process can appear as proposing different values to different correct processes.) It follows that, as noticed and deeply investigated in [18] , the solvability of Byzantine k-set agreement is sensitive to the particular validity property that is considered. This paper considers the following validity property (introduced in [16] where it is called intrusion-tolerance): no value proposed only by Byzantine processes can be decided by a non-faulty process. One way to be able to design a k-set algorithm providing this property, consists in allowing a non-faulty process to decide a default value ⊥, except (to prevent triviality) when the non-faulty processes propose the same value. (The ⊥ decision at some non-faulty processes can occur for example in the adversary scenario where the non-faulty processes propose different values, while the Byzantine processes propose the same value). Another way to design a k-set algorithm providing intrusion-tolerance consists in adding a constraint on the total number of different values that can be proposed by the non-faulty processes. Let m ≥ 2 be this number. It is shown in [10] that, in an n-process system where up to t may commit Byzantine failures, such a constraint is n − t > mt (i.e., there is a value proposed by at least (t + 1) non-faulty processes).
Content of the paper.
This paper is on Byzantine k-set agreement. It has two main contributions.
• The first is a pair of all-to-all communication abstractions. The first one, called MV-broadcast (where MV stands for "Multivalued Validated"), allows the non-faulty processes to exchange values in such a way that all the non-faulty processes eventually obtain the same set of values, and none of these values is from Byzantine processes only. The second one, called SMV-broadcast (where S stands for "Synchronized") is built on top the first one, and is such that, if a non-faulty process obtains a set with a single value, the set obtained by any other non-faulty process contains this value. The important point is that these communication abstractions allow the processes to exchange values while eliminating the values sent only by Byzantine processes. They generalize to the "multivalue" case the communication abstractions introduced in [14] , where the set of values that the processes exchange is limited to two values.
• The second contribution is a modular k-set agreement algorithm for asynchronous message-passing systems where processes may commit Byzantine failures. This algorithm, which round-based, relies on the previous SMV-broadcast abstraction, and (as already announced) on the additional computational power supplied by local random coins (with several sides). As far as we know, this is the first randomized k-set agreement algorithm for asynchronous Byzantine message-passing systems.
The previous Byzantine-tolerant algorithms have two noteworthy features. The first is that they all are signature-free. This means that the "adversary" is not required to be computationally bounded. The second is their conceptual simplicity, which is a first-class property.
Roadmap.
The paper is composed of 5 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model and a basic broadcast abstraction (called NDbroadcast, where ND stand for "No Duplicity") introduced in [25] . As indicated by its name, this broadcast operation, which requires t < n/3, allow to hide a duplicity behavior which can be produced by Byzantine processes. Then Section 3 presents the MV-broadcast and SMV-broadcast abstractions. SMV-broadcast is based on both MV-broadcast and ND-broadcast. Section 4 presents the modular randomized k-set agreement algorithm, whose construction relies on two instances of SMV-broadcast per round. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
COMPUTATION MODEL AND ND-BROADCAST
Computation Model
Asynchronous processes.
The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 asynchronous sequential processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. "Asynchronous" means that each process proceeds at its own pace, which may vary arbitrarily with time, and remains always unknown to the other processes.
Communication network.
The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. "Asynchronous" means that a message is eventually received by its destination process, i.e., there is no bound on message transfer delays. "Reliable" means that the network does not loss, duplicate, modify, or create messages. "Point-to-point" means that there is a bi-directional communication channel between each pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a message, it can identify its sender.
A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive "send TAG(m) to pj", where TAG is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process receives a message by executing the primitive "receive()".
The operation broadcast TAG(m) is a macro-operation which stands for "for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} send TAG(m) to pj end for".This operation is usually called unreliable broadcast (if the sender crashes in the middle of the for loop, it is possible that only an arbitrary subset correct processes receives a message).
Failure model.
Up to t processes may exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is correct or non-faulty. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. As a simple example, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message m to all the processes, can send a message m1 to some processes, a different message m2 to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. More generally, a Byzantine process has an unlimited computational power, and Byzantine processes can collude to "pollute" the computation. Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can impersonate another process, but Byzantine processes are not prevented from influencing the delivery order of messages sent to correct processes.
Discarding messages from Byzantine processes.
If, according to its algorithm, a process pj is assumed to send a single message TAG() to a process pi, then pi processes only the first message TAG(v) it receives from pj. This means that, if pj is Byzantine and sends several messages TAG(v), TAG(v ′ ) where v ′ = v, etc., all of them except the first one are discarded by their receivers. (Let us observe that this does not prevent multiple copies of the first message TAG() to be received and processed by their receiver.)
Notation.
This computation model is denoted BAMPn,t[∅] (BAMP stands for "Byzantine Asynchronous Message Passing"). In the following, this model is both restricted with a constraint on t and enriched with an object providing processes with additional computational power. More precisely, BAMPn,t[t < n/α] (where α is a positive integer) denotes the model BAMP n,t [∅] where the maximal number of faulty processes is smaller than n/α, and BAMP n,t[t < n/α, LRC] denotes the model BAMPn,t[t < n/α] where each process is enriched with a local random coin (LRC). Let us notice that, as LRC belongs to the model, it is given for free in BAMPn,t[t < n/α, LRC].
Time complexity.
When computing the time complexity we ignore local computation time, and consider the longest sequence of causally relate messages m1, m2, . . ., mz (i.e., for any x ∈ [2..z], the reception of mx−1 is a requirement for the sending of mx). The size of such a longest sequence defines the time complexity.
No-duplicity Broadcast
Definition of the ND-broadcast communication abstraction.
This abstraction was introduced by S. Toueg in [25] . It is defined by two operations denoted ND_broadcast() and ND_deliver(), that allow the processes to eliminate bad behaviors of Byzantine processes. More precisely, a Byzantine process is prevented from sending different messages to different correct processes, while it is assumed to send the very same message to all of them.
When a process invokes ND_broadcast() we say that it "NDbroadcasts" a message, and when it invokes ND_deliver() we say that it "ND-delivers" a message 1 . Considering an instance of NDbroadcast where the operation ND_broadcast() is invoked by a process pi, this communication abstraction is defined by the following properties.
• ND-Validity. If a non-faulty process ND-delivers a message from pi, then, if it is non-faulty, pi ND-broadcast this message.
• ND-No-duplicity. No two non-faulty processes ND-deliver distinct messages from pi.
• ND-Termination. If the sender pi is non-faulty, all the nonfaulty processes eventually ND-deliver its message.
Let us observe that, if the sender pi is faulty, it is possible that some non-faulty processes ND-deliver a message from pi while others do not ND-deliver a message from pi. As already indicated, the no-duplicity property prevents non-faulty processes from NDdelivering different messages from a faulty sender.
An algorithm implementing ND-broadcast.
It is shown in [25] that t < n/3 is a necessary requirement to implement ND-broadcast in a Byzantine asynchronous messagepassing system. Algorithm 1 (from [25] ) implements ND-broadcast in BAMPn,t n,t [t < n/3] as follows.
When a process pi wants to ND-broadcast a message whose content is vi, it broadcasts the message ND_INIT(i, vi) (line 1). When a process receives a message ND_INIT(j, −) for the first time, it broadcasts a message ND_ECHO(j, v) where v is the data content of the ND_INIT() message (line 2). If the message ND_INIT(j, v) received is not the first message ND_INIT(j, −), pj is Byzantine and the message is discarded. Finally, when pi has received the same message ND_ECHO(j, v) from (n − t) different processes, it locally ND-delivers MSG(j, v) (lines 3-4).
The algorithm considers an instance of ND-broadcast, i.e., a correct process invokes at most once ND-broadcast. Adding a sequence number to each message allows each process to ND-broadcast a sequence of messages.
Proof (The proof is from [25] . It is given for completeness.) To prove the ND-termination property, let us consider a non-faulty process pi that ND-broadcasts the message MSG(vi). As pi is nonfaulty, the message ND_INIT(i, vi) is received by all the non-faulty processes, which are at least (n − t), and every non-faulty process broadcasts ND_ECHO(i, vi) (line 2). Hence, each non-faulty process receives the message ND_ECHO processes. It follows that every non-faulty process eventually NDdelivers the message MSG(i, vi) (lines 3-4).
To prove the ND-no-duplicity property, let us assume by contradiction that two non-faulty processes pi and pj ND-deliver different messages m1 and m2 from some process p k (i.e., m1 = MSG(k, v) and m2 = MSG(k, w), with v = w). It follows from the predicate of line 3, that pi received ECHO(k, v) from a set of (n − t) distinct processes, and pj received ECHO(k, w) from a set of (n − t) distinct processes. As n > 3t, it follows that the intersection of these two sets contains a non-faulty process. But, as it is non-faulty, this sent the same message ND_ECHO() to pi and pj (line 2). Hence, m1 = m2, which contradicts the initial assumption.
To prove the ND-validity property, we show that, if Byzantine processes forge and broadcast a message ND_ECHO(i, w) such that pi is correct and has never invoked ND_broadcast MSG(w), then no correct process can ND-deliver MSG(i, w). Let us observe that at most t processes can broadcast the message ND_ECHO(i, w). As t < n−t, it follows that the predicate of line 3 can never be satisfied at a correct process. Hence, if pi is correct, no correct process can ND-deliver from pi a message that was not been ND-broadcast by pi.
✷ T heorem 1
It is easy to see that this implementation uses two consecutive communication steps and O(n 2 ) underlying messages (n − 1 in the first communication step, and n(n − 1) in the second one). Moreover, there are two types of protocol messages, and the size of the control information added to a message is log 2 n (sender identity).
MULTIVALUED VALIDATED BROADCAST: MV-BROADCAST AND SMV-BROADCAST
This section presents the all-to-all communication abstractions MV-broadcast and SMV-broadcast. "All-to-all" mean that it is assumed that all the non-faulty processes invoke the corresponding broadcast operation. As indicated in the introduction, these abstractions extend to the "multivalue" case the BV-broadcast and SBVbroadcast communication abstractions introduced in [14] , which consider binary values only.
Multivalued Validated All-to-all Broadcast
Definition of MV-broadcast.
This communication abstraction provides the processes with a single operation denoted MV_broadcast(). When a process invokes MV_broadcast TAG(m), we say that it "MV-broadcasts the message typed TAG and carrying the value m". The invocation of MV_broadcast TAG(m) does not block the invoking process. The aim of MV-broadcast is to eliminate the values (if any) that have been broadcast only by Byzantine processes.
In each instance of the MV-broadcast abstraction, each correct process pi MV-broadcasts a value and eventually obtains a set of values. To store these values, MV-broadcast provides each process pi with a read-only local variable denoted mv_valuesi. This set variable, initialized to ∅, increases asynchronously when new values are received.
Definition.
Each instance of MV-broadcast is defined by the four following properties.
• MV-Termination. The invocation of MV_broadcast() by a correct process terminates.
• MV-Justification. If pi is a correct process and v ∈ mv_validi, v has been MV-broadcast by a correct process.
• MV-Uniformity. If pi is a correct process and v ∈ mv_validi, eventually v ∈ mv_validj at every correct process pj.
• MV-Obligation. Eventually the set mv_validi of each correct process pi is not empty.
The following properties are immediate consequences of the previous definition.
• MV-Equality. The sets mv_validi of the correct processes are eventually non-empty and equal.
• MV-Integrity. The set mv_validi of a correct process pi never contains a value MV-broadcast only by Byzantine processes.
Feasibility condition in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes.
Let m be the number of different values MV-broadcast by correct processes. It follows from the previous specification that, even when the (at most) t Byzantine processes propose the same value w, which is not proposed by correct processes, w cannot belong to the set mv_validi of a correct process pi. This can be ensured if and only if there is a value MV-broadcast by at least (t + 1) correct processes. This feasibility condition is captured by the predicate n − t > mt (a proof of this feasibility condition can be found in [10] ). Hence n > (m + 1)t is a feasibility condition for MVbroadcast to cope with up to t Byzantine processes. Let us notice that, as m ≥ 2, n > (m + 1)t implies n > 3t.
An MV-broadcast algorithm.
Algorithm 2 describes a simple implementation of MV-broadcast, suited to the system model BAMPn,t[t < n/(m + 1)]. This algorithm is based on a simple "echo" mechanism. Differently from previous echo-based algorithms (e.g., [4, 24] ), the echo is used here with respect to each value that has been received (whatever the number of processes that broadcast it), and not with respect to each pair composed of a value plus the identity of the process that broadcast this value. Hence, a value entails at most one echo per process, whatever the number of processes that MV-broadcast this value.
When a process pi invokes MV_broadcast MSG(vi), it broadcasts MV_VAL(vi) to all the processes (line 1). Then, when a process pi receives (from any process) a message MV_VAL(v), ( if not yet done) it forwards this message to all the processes (line 3) if it has received the same message from at least (t + 1) different processes (line 2). Moreover, if pi has received v from at least (2t + 1) different processes, the value v is added to mv_validi (lines 5-6). Let us notice that, except in the case where |mv_validi| = m, no correct process pi can know if its set mv_validi has obtained its final value.
THEOREM 2. Algorithm 2 implements MV-broadcast in the system model BAMP n,t[t < n/(m + 1)].
Proof The proof of the MV-Termination property is trivial. If a correct process invokes MV_broadcast(), it eventually sends a message to each process, and terminates.
Proof of the MV-Justification property. To show this property, we prove that a value MV-broadcast only by faulty processes cannot be added to the set mv_validi of a correct process pi. Hence, let us assume that only faulty processes MV-broadcast v. It follows that a correct process can receive the message MV_VAL(v) from at most t different processes. Consequently the predicate of line 2 cannot be satisfied at a correct process. Moreover, as n − t > t, the predicate of line 5 cannot be satisfied either at a correct process, and the property follows.
Proof of the MV-Uniformity property. If a value v is added to the set mv_validi of a correct process pi (local delivery), this process received MV_VAL(v) from at least (n − t) different processes (line 5), i.e., from at least (n − 2t) different correct processes. As each of these correct processes sent this message to all the processes, it follows that the predicate of line 2 is eventually satisfied at each correct process, which consequently broadcasts MV_VAL(v) to all. As there are at least (n − t) correct processes, the predicate of line 5 is then eventually satisfied at each correct process, and the MV-Uniformity property follows.
Proof of the MV-Obligation property. It follows from the feasibility condition n > (m + 1)t, that there is a value v MV-broadcast by at least (t + 1) correct processes. It then follows that these processes issue MV_broadcast MSG(v), and consequently all correct processes first deliver the message MV_VAL(v) and then broadcast at line 3 (if not previously done). Hence, each correct process pi eventually delivers this message from (n − t) processes and and adds v to its set mv_validi (line 5-6), which proves the property.
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Cost of the algorithm.
As at most m values are MV-broadcast by the correct processes, it follows from the text of the algorithm that each correct process broadcasts each of these values at most once (at line 1 or line 3). Hence, if there are c ∈ [n − t..n] correct processes, their broadcasts entail the sending of at most m c n messages MV_VAL(). Finally, whatever the number of values that are MV-broadcast, the algorithm requires at most two communication steps.
Synchronized Multivalued Validated All-to-all Broadcast
Definition of SMV-broadcast.
This all-to-all communication abstraction provides the processes with a single operation denoted SMV_broadcast(). As indicated by its name, its aim is to synchronize processes so that, if a single value v is delivered to a correct process, then v is delivered to all the correct processes.
In each instance of the SMV-broadcast abstraction, each correct process invokes SMV_broadcast TAG(m), where TAG is the type of the message and m value it wants to broadcast. Such an invocation returns to the invoking process pi a set denoted viewi and called a local view. We say that a process contributes to a set viewi if the value it SMV-broadcasts belongs to viewi. SMV-broadcast is defined by the following properties.
• SMV-Termination. The invocation of SMV_broadcast TAG() by a correct process terminates.
• SMV-Obligation. The set viewi returned by a correct process pi is not empty.
• SMV-Justification. If pi is correct and v ∈ viewi, then a correct process SMV-broadcast v.
• SMV-Inclusion. If pi and pj are correct processes and viewi = {v}, then v ∈ viewj .
• SMV-Contribution. If pi is correct, at least (n − t) processes contribute to its set viewi.
• SMV-No-duplicity. Let VIEW be the union of the sets viewi of the correct processes. A process contributes to at most one value of VIEW .
The following property is an immediate consequence of the previous definition. property.
• SMV-Singleton. If pi and pj are correct,
Let v ∈ VIEW , pi a correct process, and pj a Byzantine process. It is possible that, while the value v was SMV-broadcast by pi (hence pi contributed to VIEW ), pj also appears as contributing to VIEW with the same value v. The SMV-No-duplicity property states the following: no value w ∈ VIEW \ {v} appears as a contribution of pj.
An SMV-broadcast algorithm.
Algorithm 3 implements the SMV-broadcast abstraction in the system model BAMPn,t[t < n/(m + 1)]. A process pi first MVbroadcasts a message MSG (vi) and waits until the associated set mv_valuesi is not empty (lines 1-2). Let us remind that, when pi stops waiting, mv_valuesi has not necessarily obtained its final value. Then, pi extracts a value w from mv_valuesi and NDbroadcasts it to all (line 3). Let us notice that, due to the ND-noduplicity property, no two correct processes can ND-deliver different values from the same Byzantine process.
Finally, pi waits until the predicate of line 4 is satisfied. This predicate has two aims. The first is to discard from viewi (the set returned by pi) a value broadcast only by Byzantine processes. Hence the predicate viewi ⊆ mv_valuesi. The second aim is to ensure that, if the view viewi of a correct process pi contains a single value, then this value eventually belongs to the view viewj of any correct process pj. To this end, (n − t) different processes (hence, at least (n − 2t) correct processes) must contribute to viewi. let witness(v) = number of different processes from which MV_VAL(v) was received.
then broadcast MV_VAL(v) % a process echoes a value only once % (4) end if;
then mv_validi ← mv_validi ∪ {v} % local delivery of a value % (7) end if. MV_broadcast MSG(esti); (2) wait (mv_valuesi = ∅); % mv_valuesi has not necessarily its final value when the wait statement terminates % (3)
ND_broadcast ND_AUX(w) where w ∈ mv_valuesi; (4) wait (∃ a set viewi such that its values (i) belong to mv_valuesi, and (ii) come from messages ND_AUX() received from (n − t) distinct processes); (5) return (viewi). 
Multiset version of SMV-broadcast.
While a value belongs or does not belong to a set, a multiset (also called a bag) is a set in which the same value can appear several times. As an example, while {a, b, c} and {a, b, b, c, c, c} are the same set, they are different multisets.
It is easy to see that the "set" version of the SMV-broadcast (where viewi is a set) and Algorithm 3 can be easily converted into a "multiset" version where viewi is a multiset. Both versions will be used in the randomized k-set agreement presented in Section 4. Proof Proof of the SMV-Termination property. Let us first observe that, due to the MV-Termination property and the MV-Obligation property of the underlying MV-broadcast, no correct process blocks forever at line 2. As there are at least (n − t) correct processes, and none of them blocks forever a line 2, it follows from the NDTermination property that each correct process return from the NDbroadcast at line 3, and eventually ND-delivers values from at least the (n−t) correct processes. Moreover, due to the MV-Justification property, these values have been SMV-broadcast by correct processes, and, due to the MV-Uniformity property, the sets mv_validi of all correct processes are eventually equal. It then follows that the predicate of line 4 becomes eventually satisfied at any correct process pi, and consequently the invocations of SMV_broadcast() of the correct processes terminate.
Proof of the SMV-Obligation property. Any correct process pi eventually ND-delivers (n − t) messages ND_AUX() sent by correct processes. As (a) these messages carry values taken from the set mv_valuesx of correct processes, and (b) these sets (b.1) are eventually equal at all correct processes, and (b.2) contain all values ND-broadcast at line 3 by the correct processes, it follows (from the predicate of line 4) that the set viewi returned by a correct process is not empty.
Proof of the SMV-Justification property. This property follows directly from the fact that the predicate of line 4 discards the values ND-broadcast only by Byzantine processes, and from the MVJustification property, namely, the set mv_valuesi of a correct process contains only values MV-broadcast by correct processes.
Proof of the SMV-Inclusion property. Let us consider a correct process pi and assume viewi = {v}. It follows from the predicate of line 4 that pi has ND-delivered the same message ND_AUX(v) from at least (n − t) different processes. As at most t of them are Byzantine, it follows that pi ND-delivered this message from at least (n − 2t) different correct processes, i.e., as n − 2t ≥ t + 1, from at least (t + 1) correct processes.
Let us consider any correct process pj . This process ND-delivered messages ND_AUX() from at least (n − t) different processes. As (n − t) + (t + 1) > n, it follows that there is a correct process px that ND-broadcast the same message ND_AUX(v) to pi and pj. It follows that v ∈ viewj, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of the SMV-Contribution property. This property follows trivially from the part (ii) of the waiting predicate of line 4.
Proof of the SMV-No-duplicity property. This property is an immediate consequence of the ND-No-duplicity property of the NDbroadcast issued at line 3.
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RANDOMIZED BYZANTINE K-SET AGREEMENT
This section presents and proves correct a Byzantine k-set agreement algorithm, which is built in a modular way on top of the SMVbroadcast communication abstraction and the additional computational power supplied to each process by a local random coin (LRC).
Intrusion-tolerant
Byzantine k-set Agreement
The intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) k-set agreement was informally presented in the introduction. It is assumed that each non-faulty process invokes an operation called propose k (). This operation has an input parameter v, which is the value proposed by the invoking process. It returns a value, which is called the "value decided" by the invoking process. ITB k-set agreement is formally defined in terms of properties that any solution must to satisfy. When considering deterministic k-set agreement algorithms, these properties are the following ones.
• KS-D-Termination. If a correct process invokes propose k (), it decides a value.
• KS-Validity. If a correct process decides v, then v was proposed by a correct process.
• KS-Agreement. The set of values decided by the correct processes contains at most k values.
As we are interested in a randomized algorithm to solve k-set agreement, the termination property has to be weakened as follows: any correct process decides with probability 1. In the context of round-based randomized algorithms, this property can restated as follows.
• KS-RR-Termination. limr→+∞ Probability [pi decides by round r] = 1.
Enriching the Basic Byzantine Asynchronous Model with a Random Coin
As announced, the additional computational power used to solve ITB k-set agreement despite Byzantine processes is supplied by a multi-sided random coin denoted LRC. The random abstraction LRC provides each process with a local coin that provides it with a single operation denoted random(). Each invocation takes a finite set X as input parameter, and returns a value of X such that each value of X as the probability 1/|X| to be returned.
As seen in the introduction, we assume k ≤ t. Moreover, we have also seen that, in order a correct process decides neither a value proposed only by Byzantine processes, nor a predefined default value, it is assumed that, whatever the domain of the values that can be proposed by the correct processes, in any execution, at most m different values are proposed by correct processes, where m depends on n and t, namely, n > t(m + 1). Finally, to rule out the trivial algorithm in which a correct process decides the value it proposes, we assume k < m.
Hence, assuming the non-triviality conditions k < m and k ≤ t, and the fact that, in any execution, at most m different values are proposed by the correct processes, the system model considered here to solve the ITB k-set agreement problem is BAMP n,t[t < n/(m + 1), LRC].
A Randomized Byzantine k-Set Agreement Algorithm
Local variables.
To solve the ITB k-set agreement problem, Algorithm 4, which is round-based, relies on a very modular construction. Each process pi manages two local variables whose scope is the whole execution: a local round number ri, and a local estimate of a decision value, denoted esti. It also manages three local variables whose scope is the current round r: a multiset viewi[r, 1], an auxiliary variable aux, and a set viewi[r, 2].
Description of the algorithm.
When pi invokes propose k (vi) it assigns vi to esti and initializes ri to 0 (line 1). Then pi enters a loop that it will exit at line 8 by executing return(v), which returns the decided value v and stops its participation in the algorithm.
Each round r executed by a process pi is made up of two phases. During the first phase of round r, each correct process pi invokes SMV_broadcast(esti) (multiset version) and stores the multiset returned by this invocation in viewi[r, 1]. Let us remind that this multiset contains only values SMV-broadcast by at least one correct process. The aim of this phase is to build a global set 2 , denoted AUX [r], which contains at most (k + 1) values, such that at most k of them are contributed by correct processes, and the other one is the default value ⊥. To this end, each correct process pi checks if there is a value v that appears "enough" (say W ) times in the multiset viewi[r, 1]. If there is such a value v, pi adopts it (assignment aux ← v), otherwise it adopts the default value ⊥ (line 5).
The set AUX [r] is made up of the aux variables of all the correct processes. For AUX [r] to contain at most k non-⊥ values, W has to be such that (k + 1)W > n (there are not enough processes for (k + 1) different values such that each of them was contributed by W processes) 3 . Hence, W > n/(k + 1 [1, 1] in the algorithm) locally output by the first MV-broadcast instance invoked by pi. The use of these sets allows the algorithm to benefit from the fact that these sets are eventually equal at all correct processes (MVEquality property). The KS-Termination relies on this property.
As shown in the proof, an important behavioral property of the algorithm lies in the fact that, at any round r, it is impossible for two correct processes pi and pj to be such that (⊥ / ∈ viewi[r, 2]) ∧ (viewi[r, 2] = {⊥}). These two predicates are mutually exclusive.
On the value of W .
The value W is used at line 5 for a safety reason, namely, no more than k non-⊥ values can belong to the set AUX [r]. As we have seen, this is captured by the constraint W (k + 1) > n. It appears that W has also to be constrained for a liveness reason, namely, when the correct processes start a new round r with at most k different estimates values, none of them must adopt the value ⊥ at line 5 (otherwise, instead of deciding at line 7, they could loop forever).
This liveness constraint is as follows. Let us consider the size of the multiset viewi[r, 1] obtained at line 4. In the worst case, when the correct processes start a new round r with at most k different estimates, viewi[r, 1] may contain (k − 1) different values, each appearing (W − 1) times, and only one value that appears W times. Hence, viewi[r, 1] must contain at least (W − 1)(k − operation propose k (vi) is (1) esti ← vi; ri ← 0; (2) repeat forever (3) ri ← ri + 1; // ------------phase 1 -------------------- (4) viewi 
On message identities.
The messages PHASE() SVM-broadcast at line 4 and line 6 are identified by a pair [r, x] where r is a round number and x ∈ {1, 2} a phase number. Each of these messages gives rise to underlying messages ND_AUX() (Algorithm 2), MV_VAL() (Algorithm 1), and underlying sets witness() (Algorithm 1). Each of them inherits the pair identifying the message PHASE() it originates from.
On the messages DECIDE().
Before a correct process decides a value v, it sends a message DECIDE(v) to each other process (line 8). Then, it stops its execution. This halting has not to prevent correct processes from terminating, which could occur if they wait forever underlying messages ND_AUX() or MV_VAL() from pi.
To this end, a message DECIDE(v) has to be considered as representing an infinite set of messages. More precisely if, while executing a round r, a process pi receives a message DECIDE(v) from a process pj, it considers that it has received from pj the following set of messages: {ND_AUX[r It is easy to see that the messages DECIDE() simulate a correct message exchange that could be produced, after it has decided, by a deciding but nonterminating process.
Another solution would consist in using a Reliable Broadcast abstraction that copes with Byzantine processes. In this case, a process could decide a value v as soon as it has RB-delivered (t + 1) messages DECIDE(v). An algorithm implementing such a reliable broadcast is presented in [4] . This algorithm requires O(n 3 ) messages and assumes n < t/3, which is a necessary requirement to implement reliable broadcast in the presence of Byzantine processes.
Proof of the Algorithm
The proof considers the system model BAMP n,t[t < n/(m + 1), LRC], the algorithmic safety and liveness constraints on W , namely, W (k + 1) > n and n − t ≥ (W − 1)k + 1, and the non-triviality condition (k < m) ∧ (k ≤ t).
Preliminary remark 1.
The proof considers the semantic of the messages DECIDE() described previously. This is equivalent to consider that, after it has decided, a correct process continues executing while skipping line 8.
Notation.
Given a round r, let EST [r] be the set of estimate values of the correct processes when they start round r, and AUX [r] be the set including the values of the auxi variables of the correct processes at the end of the first phase of round r (i.e., just after line 5). let us notice that AUX [r] can contain ⊥.
